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Abstract:  Two phenomena have been recently utilised to explain conflict onset among 
rational choice analysts: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over 
valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it 
produces fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of inter-ethnic or horizontal 
inequality. Identity formation is also crucial to intra-state conflict, as it overcomes the 
collective action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone, yet, the greed 
versus grievance hypotheses may be complementary explanations for conflict. The greed 
explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works best in cross-country studies, 
but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in quantitative country-case studies. 
Grievances and horizontal inequalities may be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but 
not necessarily why they persist. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for 
the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown which we 
describe as the failure of the social contract. The degradation of the social contract is more 
likely in the context of poverty and growth failure. The paper provides a synthesis of the 
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1 Introduction 
 
Civil war is a multi-faceted problem. Not only does it produce human tragedies on a 
colossal scale, but it creates humanitarian crises that are of concern to the 
international community, as well as contributing to global and regional insecurity. 
Civil war is also a major cause of underdevelopment, and perpetuates poverty, see 
Murshed (2002) and Collier et. al. (2003). The number of countries embroiled in a 
civil war increased up to 1994, and has since declined (Hegre, 2004). See Harbom, 
Högbladh and Wallensteen (2006) for an enumeration of the number of armed 
conflicts in the post-second world war period. The number of new civil wars 
emerging also seems to have fallen in the last decade (Hegre, 2004). But the average 
duration of civil wars, standing at 16 years in 1999, does not exhibit a downward 
trend (Fearon, 2004). For all of these reasons ending conflict or reducing its intensity 
must be a very high policy imperative in the development agenda.  
 
Civil wars are not a homogenous phenomenon. Their origins, motivations and 
objectives vary. A useful guide to the typology of conflict can be found in Besançon 
(2005). The discussion on the typology of civil war points to four broad types: 
genocides, revolutions or rebellions against the state, secessionist wars and 
internationalised wars (where adjoining states or the great powers get involved). 
Many examples of contemporary conflict do not always fit neatly into only one of the 
categories mentioned. Besides civil wars, there are other forms of large scale 
organised violence. Transnational terrorism is the most important ‘other’ type of 
collective violence, where the perpetrators have a very different motivation compared 
to participants of civil wars. In addition, we also have routine and sectarian violence 
where the state is not a direct protagonist (hence they are not civil wars). 
 
According to the rational choice paradigm, conflict is a result of choice. This may be 
of a myopic nature, as negotiated settlements which avoid the losses that ensue from 
war, are usually Pareto superior. Another way of stating this is that conflict is a 
special form of non-cooperative behaviour; other forms of non-cooperative behaviour 
which are less destructive, and cooperation are superior to costly non-cooperative 
interaction. But circumstances (constraints, poverty, institutional failure), mistrust 
(coordination failure), impatience and myopia (discounting the future) may rule out   3
cooperation or more peaceful forms of non-cooperative negotiation, making conflict 
an optimal choice for group leaders who have to take into account, at least, some of 
the interests of their followers.  
 
In recent years, two phenomena have been utilised to explain conflict onset among 
academic economists: greed and grievance. The former is due to the influential work 
of Paul Collier (see, Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004), and is more popular amongst 
economists. According to this view, conflict reflects elite competition over valuable 
natural resource rents, concealed with the fig leaf of collective grievance. 
Additionally, rebellions need to be financially viable: civil wars supported by natural 
resource based rents like blood diamonds or oil, or when sympathetic diasporas 
provide a ready source of finance, are more likely to occur. Above all, there was the 
assertion that inequality played no part in adding to the risk of civil war. More 
recently, Paul Collier and his associates (2003) emphasise the poverty trap: poverty 
makes soldiering less unattractive, more generally lowering the opportunity cost of 
war in poor nations. In turn, conflict serves to perpetuate poverty because of war’s 
destructiveness; a vicious cycle of poverty-conflict-poverty ensues. Collier’s views 
are extremely influential in donor policy circles (including ministers in charge of 
disbursing aid), and has received immense publicity in the Western media (Financial 
Times,  International Herald Tribune,  Time). Fearon and Laitin (2003) assert that 
ethnic or religious diversity makes little contribution to civil war risk, which are 
mainly caused by diminished state capacity in the context of poverty. This finding, 
taken together with Collier’s work has a simple intuitive appeal; civil wars occur in 
poverty stricken, failed states characterised by venal, corrupt and inept regimes, with 
the dynamics of war sustained by a motivation akin to banditry. It also provides 
intellectual excuses for direct, colonial style, intervention to prevent failing states 
from collapsing.  
 
But in many ways, these views go against the grain. There is a long-standing position 
in political science that relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) and the grievance that it 
produces fuels internal violence. Identity is also crucial to intra-state conflict. This is 
due to the collective action problem, as discussed in Olson (1965). It is difficult to 
mobilise large groups to undertake collective action, because of mutual mistrust, 
monitoring difficulties and the free-rider problem. Ethnic identities, whether based on   4
race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or regional differences, may serve as a more 
effective amalgam for the purposes of group formation, compared to other forms of 
more transient difference that are traditionally stressed by Marxist writers, such as 
socioeconomic class. The formation of enduring identities are therefore central to 
mobilising groups, including the machinations of conflict entrepreneurs who organise 
men to fight each other; see Tilly (1978) and Gurr (2000) on this. Conflict cannot 
proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences, or grievance, 
which may have historical dimensions. More recently, Frances Stewart (2000) has 
introduced the notion of horizontal inequality, the inequality between groups, rather 
than the inequality that may exist amongst an ethnically homogenous population 
(vertical inequality). Indeed, it may be the case that vertical inequality in a 
homogenous population, despite the class differences it engenders, does not seriously 
increase the risk of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). But that could still leave a 
role for group inequality (for which data is scarce), which these authors choose to 
ignore.    
 
The purpose of this paper is to critically review the greed versus grievance 
hypotheses. The rest of the work is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the 
greed hypothesis, whereas section 3 looks at issues relating to grievance and 
horizontal inequality. Section 4 puts forward a synthesis of greed and grievance 
related to malfunctioning institutions, which may be described as the social contract. 
Finally, section 5 concludes with a summary and policy implications for 




2  The Greed or Natural Resource Based Explanation for Conflict 
 
This section shall proceed as follows. We start with a discussion on the theory of 
greed for conflict; we then examine measurement issues and their implications for the 
cross country empirical evidence on greed.  
 
2.1. The theory of greed  
   5
The greed motivation behind civil war has been popularised by empirical work
3 on the 
causes of civil war where a cross-section of conflicts in different nations is analyzed 
together econometrically, and greed is proxied by the availability or abundance of 
capturable natural resource rents. In Collier and Hoeffler (2004) civil wars stem from 
the greedy behaviour of a rebel group in organising an insurgency against the 
government. Greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group. The opportunities 
can be disaggregated into three components: financing, recruitment and geography. 
The most common sources of rebel finance are the appropriation of natural resources, 
donations from sympathetic diasporas residing abroad, contributions from foreign 
states (hostile to the government) or multinational companies interested in the region. 
Natural resource wealth is the chief among the three in terms of its relative 
importance. Recruitment is about the opportunity to induct fighting manpower; 
something made easier when there is a high proportion of young unemployed males in 
population, in a setting of endemic poverty and poor education. Geographical 
situations favourable to rebel groups are mountainous terrain and other safe havens 
for insurgents. In short, greed simply means the ‘economic opportunity’ to fight, and 
should be distinguished from socio-political grievances. Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) 
empirical findings conclude that the set of variables representing rebel opportunity or 
greed akin to loot-seeking are the main reasons for civil war. By implication, the 
alternative hypothesis of grievance (justice-seeking) focusing on ethnic religious 
divisions, political repression and horizontal inequality is dismissed, although its 
invalidity is not formally tested for. Natural resource rents constitute 'booty' and this 
fact has been used to emphasise the greed or criminal motivation for civil war. Central 
to the Collier and Hoeffler’s empirical testing for the greed hypothesis is the role of 
primary commodities in the economic structure. They measure the dependence on 
natural resources by the share of primary commodity exports in GDP, and the validity 
of this metric as well as the statistical robustness of the relationship between resource 
rents and the risk of conflict has been called into question. Be that as it may, the 
combined Collier and Hoeffler greed and Fearon and Laitin (2003) messages about 
greed and state failure causing rebellion or civil war has had an immense influence in 
the media and the donor policy community’s thinking about conflict.  
 
                                                 
3 Mainly, although not exclusively, by Paul Collier and associates.   6
The econometric models purporting to establish the empirical validity of the greed 
hypothesis, however, are atheoretical, in the sense of not having a formal economic 
model based on optimising behaviour by economic agents to explain why greed may 
cause conflict. If economic agents (homo economicus) are actuated only by self-
interest
4, we must demonstrate why they choose war over other alternatives. 
Therefore, any theorising about greed must be based on the economic motivations for 
violence and criminality. Belligerents in the wars of natural-resource rich countries 
could be acting in ways close to what Olson (1996) referred to as 'roving bandits' —
who have no encompassing interest in preserving the state or its people but are simply 
intent on loot—than to 'stationary' bandits who take control of the state and seek to 
maximise their own profit by encouraging stability and growth in their new domain. 
Civil wars motivated by the desire to control natural resource rents could also mirror 
“warlord competition”, a term that owes its origins to the violent competition between 
leaders attempting to control economic resources in the context of medieval Europe, 
Skaperdas (2002). 
 
In a nutshell, a proper greed-based theory of civil war must relate to the trade-off 
between production and predation in making a living, where we may view war as theft 
writ large. Violence is one means of appropriating the resources of others. Note, that 
armed conflict implies the absence of contractual interaction (Edgeworth, 1881), and 
is in stark contrast to the alternative method of benefiting from the endowments of 
others via peaceful and voluntary exchange (trade) between economic agents, groups 
or nations. This implies that we also need to specify the conditions under which 
violence becomes a viable or more attractive option relative to other alternatives. 
 
A variety of game theoretic models describing the non-cooperative and conflictive 
interaction between groups exist, where the object is to capture the rival’s endowment 
by force. One such model is due to Hirshleifer (1995), where each group has a fixed 
resource endowment, which can be used to either produce goods for consumption or 
armaments to fight the other group. Groups exist in a state of non-contractual anarchy 
vis-à-vis each other; this also implies the absence of enforceable property rights. The 
object of fighting is to capture some of the rival’s endowment. Success in war is 
                                                 
4 This commonly held view is actually a gross over-simplification.    7
uncertain, and the probability of victory is given by a Tullock (1980) contest success 
function, where the probability of victory for any group is given by their own military 
expenditure relative to the total fighting outlay made by all protagonists. Additionally, 
there is a military effectiveness parameter (akin to what is known as a force multiplier 
in military establishments); something that raises the effectiveness of each unit of 
fighting effort. In the absence of increasing returns to scale in military effectiveness, 
and if a minimum subsistence income is present there will be a Nash non-cooperative 
equilibrium associated with some fighting. In other words, in the equilibrium both (or 
all) parties will be engaged in some fighting with each other, as well as some 
productive activities; unless one side manages to conquer others due to its individual 
military superiority.  Hirshleifer (1995) describes this as a state of anarchy --
something akin to primitive tribal warfare. Note, no possibility of trade is permitted 
between groups.   
 
Skaperdas (1992) outlines a model that is similar because it has a fixed resource 
endowment which can be devoted to either production or armament. The probability 
of success in war also depends on a similar contest success function. Skaperdas 
(1992), however, allows for a peaceful trading cooperative equilibrium when there is 
no fighting. The parties simply share the sum of total resources in proportion to the 
contest success function, or in accordance with what would have been the equilibrium 
outcome of war. This is likely when the probability of military success for either side 
is low, and both parties are similar in their peaceful productive capacities. Secondly, 
there is a possible outcome where one side only produces, whereas the other party 
does some fighting and production. This is a more likely outcome when the more 
pacific side is more productive, and the side that chooses fighting is more efficient at 
it. Finally, both sides may choose a mix of fighting and production. As with the first 
possibility, each side must be similar in their economic productivity and fighting 
effectiveness, but here the technology of war is such that it raises the probability of 
victory for both sides, hence the presence of fighting. In many ways, Skapedas’s 
(1992) model puts the trade-off between fighting and predation into sharper   8
perspective, and explicitly mentions the absence of contract or respect for property 
rights.
5   
 
Both these models, however, neglect the destructiveness of war (collateral damage), 
and its capacity to ravage productive capacity, additional to direct military 
expenditure. These models employ intermediate inputs, and not factors of production, 
which can be costlessly shifted between fighting and production. Secondly, there is no 
growth in these models, something which would raise the opportunity costs of war. A 
similar effect could arise from complementarities in production between groups 
and/or economies of scale, which would make mergers between groups or cooperation 
in each group’s self-interest. Thirdly, the possibilities of peaceful exchange need to be 
limited (absent in Hirshleifer, 1995) in order to rationalise conflict. In traditional 
economics the gains from trade arise mainly from differences in tastes, technology 
and endowments, and these gains from trade need to be minimised in order to make 
conflict an optimal choice. Violent means are attractive when the intention is to 
extract resources (as in the case of colonial plantations and mines) or accumulate 
surpluses at the expense of others (mercantilism). Fourthly, these models imply full 
information. In the presence of asymmetric information, misperceptions about contest 
success, the opposition’s intentions and so on, wars that do not maximise expected 
utility under full information may break out, akin to problems associated with moral 
hazard and adverse selection. Fifthly, such theorising is broadly blind to institutions 
(despite ruling out the existence of property rights and between-group contracts), and 
the presence of transactions costs that breed mutual mistrust. Wars can also reflect the 
absence of institutions which facilitate negotiation and peaceful exchange.   
 
Despite these limitations, there is much in these models that can explain the greedy 
behaviour as analyzed by the empirical exponents of the greed hypothesis. The 
presence of readily capturable natural resource based rents may make conflict more 
attractive when compared to peaceful production, as can a shortage of intermediate 
inputs due to population pressure. These resources are best regarded as a non-
produced ‘prize’ such as oil or diamonds (which apart from extraction costs are like 
manna from heaven), whose ownership is violently contested. Secondly, contributions 
                                                 
5 Even in societies with property rights, there still may be violent or non-violent competition over 
resources which have, as yet, unassigned ownership.     9
from a sympathetic diaspora (or aid from a super-power in the cold war era) can raise 
the probability of victory of a potential rebel group against the state. Thirdly, the 
inability of the state to act as a Stackelberg leader in a potentially divided nation may 
raise the chances of war between groups in a manner similar to the weak state 
capacity mechanism favoured by some political scientists (like James Fearon). For 
example, in the Hirshleifer (1995) model where different groups are in a state of 
anarchy vis-à-vis one another, the ability of one group to behave as a Stackelberg 
leader reduces equilibrium fighting levels and raises each side’s per-capita income. 
The leader, however, gains relatively less compared to followers, creating an 
incentive for each side to be a follower. If one group is strong and militarily more 
effective it will dominate other groups, and there will be no fighting in the 
equilibrium. This may lead to state formation, which may or may not lead to the re-
configuration of group identities. If inter-group rivalries persist, state disintegration 
occurs when the dominant group can no longer control other groups.   
 
Finally, war implies the absence of contract, and warring parties may enter into 
contracts that make their interactions more peaceful. This will be all the more true, if 
war causes substantial collateral damage. Groups may also decide to merge in order to 
reap economies of scale in production. If they do not do so when it is clearly in their 
mutual self-interest we have to resort to explanations based on misperceptions, 
mistrust or the lack of institutions that enforce contracts. Alternatively, the institutions 
that once bound groups together may have disintegrated. We shall return to these 
issues in section 4. We now return to the empirical hypotheses that buttress cross-
country econometric studies of civil war, which are dominated by various forms of a 
greed (or modified greed) and state failure hypotheses.  
 
2.2. Empirical Issues in Connection with the Greed Mechanism 
 
While Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) push for the case of the greedy rebel 
mechanism derived from their findings regarding the strong explanatory power of the 
share of primary commodity export to GDP (as a proxy for natural resource wealth), 
others are less sanguine. In short, the empirical controversy over the link between 
natural resource wealth and greed hypothesis are about the saliency of mechanisms in-  10
between natural resource rents and conflict, as well as measurement issues and 
estimation techniques.  
 
Humphreys (2005), for example, argues that other mechanisms may be present. First, 
is the greedy outsider mechanism: the existence of natural resources may be an 
incentive for third parties—states and corporations— to engage in or indeed foster 
civil conflict. Second, is the grievance mechanism: natural resource dependence could 
in fact be associated with grievances rather than greed. There are at least four variants 
of this mechanism: (i) countries with middling levels of dependence on natural 
resources may be experiencing transitory inequality as part of the development 
process, (ii) economies that are dependent on natural resources may be more 
vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, (iii) the process of extraction may produce 
grievances, for example, through forced migration, and (iv) natural resources wealth 
may be seen as more unjustly distributed than other wealth.
 Third, is the weak state 
mechanism. Natural resource dependent economies may have weaker states, which 
stems from the nature of state revenue that is dependent on resource rents. On the one 
hand, untaxed citizens have less ability or incentive to monitor state activity. On the 
other hand, governments relying more on natural resource rents rather than taxation 
have weak incentives to create strong and accountable bureaucratic structures, similar 
to the logic of no accountability without taxation (Ross, 2004a).   
 
Any measure of natural resource dependence may also be endogenous to conflict, 
which has two implications: (i) reverse causality, in which civil wars might cause 
resource dependence by reducing the size of a country’s non-resource sector (e.g. 
manufacturing), and (ii) spurious correlation, where both civil war and resource 
dependence might be independently caused by an unmeasured third variable, such as 
poor property rights or the weak rule of law.  
 
On the matter of measurement, two broad sets of issues need to be considered: (i) the 
measure of natural resource wealth/dependence, and (ii) the construction of the 
relevant conflict dependent variable.     
 
Before we examine the various alternative metrics for natural resource dependence, 
note that the term primary commodity includes both agricultural commodities and   11
minerals/fuels, but crucially excludes illegal substances (coca and heroin) as well as 
illegal alluvial diamonds in Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004). Certain varieties of 
resources are more easily captured: they may be lootable such as alluvial diamonds (in 
Sierra Leone, Angola) available along river beds using artisanal techniques or illicit 
drugs such as coca in Colombia; obstructable like an oil pipe line; see Ross (2003) on 
these issues. Illicit gemstones and drugs are arguably more crucial to financing rogue 
conflict entrepreneurs in a greed based conflict; their omission is a serious flaw. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) do not differentiate different types of natural 
resources, such as between lootable and non-lootable natural resources (Lujala, 
Gleditsch and Gilmore 2005), and between point-source and diffuse natural resources 
(Murshed, 2004). Lootable point source natural resources are in particular prone to be 
illegally exploited and traded. Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) are only concerned 
with past natural production, neglecting future prospects for extraction (Humphreys, 
2005). They also only focus on exports, even though production might be a better 
measure of the availability of these resources, including commodities that were first 
imported and then re-exported (Humphreys, 2005). 
 
Below is a summary of different proxies to measure resource wealth used in cross 
country empirical conflict literature: 
•  Primary commodity exports as percentage of GDP (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 
2004).   
•  Agricultural value added as percentage of GDP (Humphreys, 2005). 
•  Oil dependence; different ways of measuring this have been employed: 
o  Oil  production and reserves per capita (Humphreys, 2005). This is to 
distinguish between past and future exploitation of natural resources. 
o  Oil rents per capita, that is further distinguished between off-shore and on-
shore oil (Ross, 2006).  
o  Oil exporter dummy, where oil exceeds one-third of total exports (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). 
o  Oil exports as percentage of total exports; Fearon (2005) adds this measure 
to the Collier-Hoeffler model to specifically locate the oil effect, finding that 
the effect of primary commodities on conflict is confined to oil.  
     12
•  Diamonds; different ways of measuring diamond wealth have been employed: 
o  Diamond production per capita (Humphreys, 2005). Ross (2006) further 
disaggregates it into primary and secondary production to differentiate the 
unlootable and lootable nature of this resource. 
o  A dummy for the presence of diamonds and disaggregated further into 
primary and secondary (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore 2005). They find that 
the lootable secondary diamonds increases the risk of civil war onset and its 
duration, while the primary one does not.  They create mainly ethnic civil 
wars rather than other forms of civil wars. This risk has been greater since 
the end of the cold war. Non-lootable deep mine shaft diamonds, however, 
lowers the risk of civil war onset. 
 
•  Resource rents as percentage of gross national income (de Soysa and Neumayer, 
2007). They differentiate between energy rents and mineral rents; the former 
consists of oil, gas and coal, while the latter includes bauxite, copper, iron ore, 
lead, nickel, phosphate rock, tin, zinc, gold and silver.   
•  Contraband dummy; conflicts in which a rebel group derives major funds from 
contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca tend to have longer civil war 
duration (Fearon, 2004). 
 
Another related issue is the proper specification of the conflict dependent variable in 
econometric analyses; it can either be the onset or duration of civil war. With regard 
to onset, the question is whether natural resource wealth increases or decreases the 
risk or likelihood of civil war; and with duration, whether or not it prolongs civil war. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) claim that resource abundance measured by 
primary goods exports to GDP in increasing the likelihood of civil war onset is 
significant and robust; while others say that it is not significant (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Fearon, 2005) or it is not robust (Ross, 2004b). On duration, the results are 
again contradictory. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) find that primary 
commodities have no significant effect on the duration; but decreases in primary 
commodity prices would shorten conflict since it squeezes rebel finances, when the 
level of dependence upon primary commodity exports is high. Using contraband 
dummy measures, Fearon (2004) and Ross (2006) find that natural resources lengthen   13
civil war duration; while using diamond production per capita, Humphreys (2005) 
finds that this reduces war duration.   
 
When civil war onset is a dummy (0, 1) variable, an additional complication is 
regarding the appropriate fatality threshold for coding a case as a civil war/conflict. 
There are three variants employed: (i) 1000 battle related deaths annually (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004), (ii) 1000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005), and (iii) 25 battle related deaths annually (de 
Soysa, 2002).   
 
On estimation techniques, Fearon (2005) provides the strongest challenge to Collier 
and Hoeffler’s (2002, 2004) empirical finding on the link between primary 
commodity exports and civil war. Fearon, who re-estimates Collier and Hoeffler’s 
model using country-year observations, as apposed to country-five year observations 
employed by Collier and Hoeffler,
6 finds that the significance of statistical 
associations between primary commodity export and civil war onset vanish in the 
country-year regression, meaning that the previous claim of such a relationship is 
simply not robust. In other words, this cross-country result will not withstand 
variation in sample and data coverage. A similar view is shared by Ross (2004b), who 
reviews 14 cross country empirical studies on natural resource and civil war. Ross 
(2004b) concludes that the claim that primary commodities are associated with the 
onset of civil war does not appear to be robust, oil dependence appears to be linked to 
the initiation of conflict, but not its duration, and illicit gemstones and drugs seem to 
lengthen pre-existing wars. Furthermore, Fearon (2005) shows that the effect of 
primary commodity exports is confined to oil; this is by adding the variable (oil 
exports to total exports) into the country-year regression. Humphreys (2005) checks 
the effect of past oil exploitation (oil production per capita) on civil war onset and 
finds it positively significant. However, he asserts that such a relationship works 
through the weak state mechanism; this is by adding interaction terms between 
measures of natural resource wealth and state weaknesses. In a similar vein to 
                                                 
6 The method of multiple imputations do not lead to Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) list-wide deletion, 
because in the latter case arbitrary five year averages result in twenty seven out of the seventy nine 
conflict cases being dropped due to missing data on right-hand side explanatory variables. However, it 
should be noted that Fearon (2005) used a lower threshold for civil war related death compared with 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004).    14
Humphreys, Fearon (2005) interprets the oil effect as a weak state mechanism rather 
than a greedy rebel hypothesis; this is by using the correlation between oil export and 
state weaknesses –measured by government observance of contracts.   
 
Reverting to the Collier and Hoeffler greed hypothesis, properly stated it is actually an 
interpretation of their empirical finding that natural resource abundance increases the 
risk of civil war. As Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 588) conclude, ‘we have interpreted 
this as being due to the opportunities such commodities provide for extortion, making 
rebellion feasible, and perhaps even attractive’. This lies at the heart of their famous 
greedy rebel mechanism. However, there is really no empirical evidence showing the 
validity of such an interpretation. In this respect, Fearon (2005) and Humphreys 
(2005) go one step further by providing empirical evidence of their weak state 
mechanism as the intervening mechanism between natural resource endowments and 
civil war, as opposed to the greedy rebel mechanism. De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) 
support such an argument.  Using resource rents data as the percentage of national 
income (differentiated into energy and mineral rents), they re-estimate both Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) models using different thresholds 
for civil war. They find that only energy rents matter for civil war onset, and reject the 
curvilinear relationship between resource dependence and civil war as proposed by 
Collier and Hoeffler. De Soysa and Neumayer interpret that the significant role of 
energy rents is more relevant with the weak state mechanism rather than the greedy 
rebel-hypothesis.         
 
Facing these challenges, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2007)
7 revisit their previous 
greed argument by saying that, 'the feasibility hypothesis proposes that where 
rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by 
whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the 
viable niche' (p. 21). They differentiate between two theories of civil war: 'feasibility' 
and 'motivation' which in turn has two variants, i.e. either 'greed' or 'grievance'. But, 
the content of their previous ‘greed' hypothesis (now part of motivation) is almost 
identical with what they now re-phrase as 'feasibility'. If feasibility is about 
                                                 
7 In 2005, an entire issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution called Paradigm in Distress, 49 (4), was 
devoted to demonstrating the non-robustness of the main conclusions of Collier and Hoeffler greed 
hypothesis   15
opportunity, greed is also about opportunity. The basic arguments and empirical 
evidence are much the same as before.      
 
In summary, greed based explanations for conflict require further refinement by 
utilising better data on capturable resource rents. Proper consideration also needs to be 
given to institutional mechanisms that cause the competition for resource rents to 
descend into outright warfare. Ultimately, greed theory is unsatisfactory, even its new 
guise as a feasibility hypothesis. This is because conflict is rarely a rational, Pareto 
optimal strategy, except in circumstances illustrated by the Hirshleifer (1995) and 
Skaperdas (1992) models discussed above where property rights are absent and the 
possibilities of exchange limited. More generally it points to institutional failure 
which encourages non-contractual behaviour, as well as the existence of asymmetric 
information. The presence of grievances is necessary for group formation and violent 
collective action, and this is what we now turn to.  
 
3    Grievances and Horizontal Inequality as Conflict Drivers  
 
In the context of civil war or rebellion, grievance is sometimes described as a justice-
seeking motivation. The discussion in this section on grievances begins with 
grievance based theories of conflict before moving on to measurement issues. 
 
3.1. Theories of Grievance  
 
Central to grievances are identity and group formation. An individual’s utility may be 
related to his identity, specifically the relative position of the group he identifies with 
in the social pecking order; see Akerlof and Kranton (2000). An individual may 
derive utility from certain normative forms of behaviour appropriate to his identity but 
considered deviant by other groups, and may even face sanctions from like-minded 
group members if he deviates from them. This type of behavioural paradigm may be 
related to solving the collective action problems (Olson, 1965), without which 
organised large-scale violence is impossible, even if we believe conflict is primarily 
motivated by greed. As noted in the introduction, some appropriate definition of 
ethnicity may be a superior basis for group formation compared to social class in an 
ethnically homogenous society.       16
 
We sub-divide theories of grievance into relative deprivation, polarization and 
horizontal inequality. While it is important to differentiate them, some overlap among 
the three definitions are inevitable.      
 
Relative deprivation 
The notion of relative deprivation dates back to the work of Ted Gurr (1970) who 
defines it as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they 
actually believe they can get; in short the disparity between aspirations and 
achievements. Thus, educational achievements may raise the aspirations of young 
people, but they will become frustrated if unemployed, occasionally venting their 
feelings in mass political violence. Gurr puts forward the following hypothesis, ‘the 
potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative 
deprivation among members of a collectivity’ (p.24). This lays down the notion of 
relative deprivation as the micro-foundation for conflict. Relative deprivation is 
considered to be a major cause of civil war, as well as sectarian and routine violence. 
 
The applications vary across ethno-communal lines, regional boundaries, societal 
class, or just the feeling of being relatively deprived vis-à-vis the general situation. In 
the eastern Indonesian province of Maluku, the traditionally privileged Christians 
group felt relatively deprived against the rising Muslim community economically and 
politically, which resulted in the bloodiest Muslim-Christian conflict in the country’s 
history (Tadjoeddin, 2003). Similar statements centring around unemployment could 
be made about the Catholic-Protestant cleavage in Northern Ireland. In Nepal, the lack 
of development in remote rural districts of the country fuelled the Maoist insurgency 
(Murshed and Gates, 2005).  
 
Another type of violence can be described as ‘routine’. Tadjoeddin and Murshed 
(2007) examine the socio-economic origins of this type of violence in Java, Indonesia. 
It is centred on vigilante violence/popular justice and inter-group/neighbourhood 
brawls. Routine violence covers group or collective violence, and it is different from 
individual violence, domestic violence, or homicide–which can simply be labelled as 
crime. The theoretical underpinnings for routine violence are similar to those utilised 
to explain mass political violence short of internal war in Hibbs (1973). Using panel   17
data analysis of count data, Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) examine the relationship 
between routine violence on one hand, and growth, poverty, and level of development 
(including education) on the other hand. The relationships between violence and the 
levels of education and income are non-linear in the form of inverted–U–shape 
curves. The reason for this is as follows: starting from low levels of average income 
and educational attainment, when these rise slightly there is much to compete over 
and quarrel about; this tendency, however, declines with further increases in income 
and education, as there is much more to lose from violence.  Another explanation is 
the feeling of being relatively deprived since rising education is not automatically 
followed by rising income.    
 
Polarisation  
A related notion is that of polarisation; see Esteban and Ray (1994) on this. 
Polarisation occurs when two groups exhibit great inter-group heterogeneity 
combined with intra-group homogeneity. Economic polarisation (along with high 
vertical income inequality) can occur in societies that are culturally homogenous. 
Ethnic polarisation could, in principal, exist along with a degree of economic equality. 
What is useful is a hybrid concept that combines identity and economic polarities, as 
in Østby (2007). In their original and seminal concept of polarisation, Esteban and 
Ray (1994) focus on the identification and alienation framework. Their idea is as 
follows: polarisation is related to the alienation that groups of people feel from one 
another, and such alienation is fuelled by the feeling of within-group identity. 
Furthermore, Esteban and Ray argue that the traditional measures of inequality are 
only concerned with interpersonal alienation, but fail to capture the dimension of 
group identity. It is important to note that ethnic polarisation requires two or a few 
ethnicities. When a society has a very large number of identities, then the term ethnic 
fractionalisation is more appropriate. Therefore, polarization is what may matter for 
conflict, rather than fractionalisation and/or overall vertical (inter-individual) 
inequality. Few studies have empirically demonstrated the existence of such an 
argument. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarisation is a 
significant explanatory variable for civil war onset, while ethnic fractionalisation is 
not.  
 
Horizontal inequality   18
The notion of horizontal inequalities between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, 
linguistic differences, tribal affiliations etc., is thought to be an important cause of 
contemporary civil war and sectarian strife, but not routine violence. The idea of 
horizontal inequality may overlap with the notion of relative deprivation and 
polarisation as will be indicated by alternative measures discussed below. The 
expression, horizontal inequality, originates in the work of Frances Stewart; see 
Stewart (2000), and should be distinguished from vertical inequality, which is the 
inequality within an otherwise homogenous population. Four sources of horizontal 
inequality may be highlighted:  
 
o  Discrimination in Public Spending and Taxation. Discrimination in the 
allocation of public spending, and unfair tax burdens, lead to serious unrest. 
Grossman (1991) develops a theoretical model of insurrection against the state 
by the peasantry reacting to over taxation, where the state is a tax-farmer 
interested in maximising the income of the rentier class. Discrimination in the 
allocation of public employment is particularly resented in societies in which 
public employment represents the principal avenue for personal advance, as in 
Burundi. In addition, the over taxation of smallholders encourages insurrection, 
and indigenous peoples often face discrimination in access to schooling, health 
care, and public-sector jobs; many of these factors are present in Nepal’s current 
civil war, see Murshed and Gates (2005). Where there are inter-group fiscal 
transfers, which may take the form of spending on education and health for 
disadvantaged groups, or including them in government employment, 
commitment to the transfer by those in power may be imperfect. This lack of 
credibility can eventually lead to civil war.  
 
o  High Asset Inequality. Agrarian societies with high inequality—for example El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nepal, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe—have high asset 
inequality, and are very prone to conflict, see Russet (1964) for an early view on 
this. Asset redistribution such as land reform to lessen inequality is more 
difficult than public finance reform. Besançon (2005), however, points out that 
purely ethnic conflicts, as opposed to revolutions and genocides, are more likely 
when a greater degree of income equality has been achieved between contending   19
ethnic groups. Inclusion in the political process is more crucial to preventing this 
type of conflict, which are not usually civil wars, as the state is not involved.  
 
o  Economic Mismanagement and Recession.  In Africa, Latin America and the 
former Soviet Union conflict ridden countries have also suffered prolonged 
economic mismanagement and growth collapse. Successive IMF and World 
Bank supported adjustment programmes in DRC-Zaire, Somalia and elsewhere 
not only proved incapable of promoting economic recovery, but given the level 
of corruption within the state, themselves became targets for capture by elite 
groups. Economic mismanagement is often associated with an uneven and unfair 
distribution of the burdens of subsequent adjustment; public spending benefiting 
the elite and the military is protected, often favouring particular ethnic groups, 
with the burden of adjustment placed on expenditures of value to the poor and 
disadvantaged groups. Also, as Rodrik (1999) emphasises, countries with weak 
institutions of conflict management, as well as high income inequality are less 
able to withstand economic shocks and experience growth failure. They are also 
more prone to the risk of civil strife and war, since their weak institutions, which 
are further weakened by shocks and lower growth, are unable to contain the 
resulting social pressure and distributional conflict. 
 
o  Grievances Related to Resource Rents: Natural resource rents can by themselves 
become a source of grievance, if local populations feel that they are not getting a 
fair share of these, as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It can also cause 
secessionist tendencies amongst relative rich regions, who no longer want to 
subsidise their fellow countrymen, as in the case of Aceh in Indonesia, see 
Tadjoeddin et. al. (2003).  
 
3.2.  Measurement of Grievance 
 
Relative deprivation  
A simple starting point in measuring relative deprivation is to calculate the simple 
ratio (or difference) between two competing groups on particular socio-economic 
indicators, and examine their evolution over time. A worsening ratio for one group 
means an improving ratio for the other which may be perceived by the deprived group   20
as unjust. Stewart (2000) applied the method to nine cases of internal conflict and 
social violence and shows that widening socio-economic horizontal inequalities over 
time contribute to ethnic violence. However, this measure can be also interpreted as a 
measure of horizontal inequality since it measures the socio-economic distance 
between two groups and their movement over time. 
 
A second practical measure is utilised by Murshed and Gates (2005), in a cross 
sectional approach, by calculating the gap of the human development index between 
sub-national entities (districts) in Nepal with its national capital, Kathmandu, which 
has the highest human development score.
8 The gap can be interpreted as the extent of 
deprivation relative to the capital’s urban and modern economic development. 
However, this measure can also be interpreted as spatial horizontal inequality, 
according to Murshed and Gates (2005). This gap measure can also be measured 
using a certain national average.
9 Within country, disaggregated data on the human 
development index is collected for many countries in Asia and Latin America. This 
data is usually available spatially --across provinces or districts. But, in some cases we 
can impute group inequalities from spatial data, because certain ethnic groups chiefly 
reside in particular areas. In a few instances, household surveys also explicitly ask 
questions about the ethnicity of households. If that is the case, we can compute 
differences (gaps) in income, poverty incidence, educational and health status across 
ethnic groups. Such data, for example, is recently available for Indonesia.  
 
Polarisation  
Esteban and Ray (1994) pioneered a polarisation measure, called the ER polarisation 
index. The index is more about social polarisation rather than identity based 
inequality.
10 The formula contains a subjective measure of α whose purpose is to 
increase the weight given to large groups, so that the index rises as the population is 
distributed among fewer and more equally sized groups. Another polarisation measure 
is proposed by Zhang and Kanbur (2001). The Zhang-Kanbur (ZK) polarisation index 
is the ratio of the between group and within group inequality based on their respective 
                                                 
8 The human development index is an un-weighted average of per-capita income, educational status and 
longevity.  
9 Analogies with the poverty-gap measure are appropriate. 
10 An ethnically homogenous society may be highly polarised, with most people being either rich or 
poor.    21
Theil index. The ZK index emphasizes the role of within-group inequality by 
implying that lower within-group inequality would increase the polarisation measure, 
an aspect that is missing in the ER polarisation measure.  
 
Horizontal inequality 
Horizontal inequality is a relatively new concept, not only is its measurement 
thwarted by the paucity of data on relevant ethnic groups, but no real theoretical 
consensus exists as yet on a metric for its measurement. But for a variety of purposes, 
including cross-national comparisons, a single index number type measure of 
horizontal inequality is required, similar to the GINI coefficient for vertical inequality. 
We also need to be clear as to which groups we wish to apply this idea to: linguistic, 
tribal, religious and so on, as there may be some overlap across these categorisations. 
For example, in diverse countries such as India or Indonesia, horizontal inequalities 
across linguistic lines will be different from those along a confessional basis. A good 
summary of the literature can be found in Stewart, Brown and Mancini (2005). 
 
As a starting point, such an index should be objective (descriptive) and not subjective 
(evaluative), as is the case for example with the Atkinson subjective measure of 
inequality aversion. Secondly, as far as its application to conflict is concerned we 
would probably be more interested in between group inequality rather than the 
inequality  within groups. So, for example if we want to examine the horizontal 
inequality between Hutus and Tutsis in promoting conflict in Burundi and Rwanda, 
we might be less interested in the inequalities that exist within each group, than 
between groups, but we are concerned with group sizes. Stewart, Brown and Mancini 
(2005) distinguish between inequality measures that are specifically designed to 
measure differences across different identity based groups, and those that adapt of 
existing measures of vertical inequality. Chief among the former are the Esteban-Ray 
index and the Zhang-Kanbur index. In the second category of measures, those already 
in use in measuring vertical inequality, the two most promising are the population 
weighted coefficient of variation
11 and the group GINI coefficient
12; see Stewart,   
Brown and Mancini (2005) for details.  
                                                 
11 The coefficient of variation is the variance divided by the mean. Population weighting may be 
appropriate as they correct for large variations owing to small population groups.  
12 The GINI compares differences between all groups.   22
 
3.3. Some Empirical Findings  
 
Horizontal inequalities have been found to significantly affect conflict in Nepal and 
Indonesia, to cite two examples of its application to individual nations. Nepal had a 
Maoist armed insurgency since 1996, which has recently subsided. Based upon data 
on human development indicators at the district level in the year of the conflict onset 
in Nepal in 1996, Murshed and Gates (2005) find that HDI gaps with the capital 
Kathmandu, as well as greater landlessness, significantly explain the intensity of 
conflict-related fatalities across different districts in Nepal, whereas natural resources 
do not. Thus variables of enduring grievance such as landlessness are the most 
significant compared to more temporary income differences; at the same time the 
greed hypothesis is invalidated. 
 
Indonesia is plagued by several conflicts, some of which are secessionist in nature, 
others are inter-communal. Four natural resource rich provinces: Aceh, Riau, East 
Kalimantan and Papua have wanted to separate from the federation. Brown (2005) 
argues that the socio-economic achievements (in terms of jobs and education) of the 
native Acehnese declined during periods when GRDP (regional income) rose 
substantially. This rise in GRDP took place because of the presence of oil and gas in 
Aceh. For example, poverty in Aceh rose by 239% during 1980-2002, whereas it fell 
by 42% in the rest of Indonesia. In Aceh, income (GRDP) per capita is 39% greater 
than the Indonesian average but expenditure per head, after redistribution through the 
fiscal system, was 18% below the national average. In Papua (rich in copper and 
silver), income per capita was 65% above the national average before the fiscal 
system came into operation. After taxes and subsidies, expenditure is 9% below the 
Indonesian average and there is a higher incidence of poverty, particularly amongst 
indigenous peoples. Thus, these separatist tendencies, in whole or part, are a reflection 
of the dissatisfaction in some of the richer and natural resource endowed areas with 
the federal authority’s redistributive policies taxing richer provinces to subsidise 
poorer regions. Ethno-communal violence can be explained by differences in district 
health status, measured by a horizontal inequality index (population weighted 
coefficient of variation); see Mancini (2005). Tadjoeddin (2003) finds interesting 
results in this connection. Converging gaps in socio-economic achievements of the   23
two competing groups contribute to ethnic violence amongst Muslims and Christians 
in Maluku, whereas widening indicators have contributed to Dayak-Madurese 
violence in Kalimantan. The latter point has also been emphasised by Besançon 
(2005). What matters is the perception of change in the relative position of each ethnic 
group’s rival community.  
 
Østby (2007) manages to construct polarisation indices and horizontal inequalities 
across 36 developing countries during 1986-2004 based on ownership of consumer 
durables (which she uses to calculate measures referred to as economic) and 
educational attainment (which she uses to calculate measures referred to as social) 
based upon household surveys. The data is drawn from demographic and health 
surveys (DHS) and does not contain information on income or wealth. Be that as it 
may, this represents a pioneering application to the cross-country conflict debate. In 
her panel and cross-sectional analysis, she finds that social and economic 
polarisation,
13 and social horizontal inequality based on education significantly 
contributes to conflict, whereas vertical inequality and purely ethnic or socioeconomic 
polarisation do not. A priori, one would expect more enduring horizontal inequalities 
based on health, education, political exclusion and asset holdings to be more 
significant compared to transient income differences. Østby (2006) utilises the same 
data set on horizontal inequalities along with a variety of political variables ranging 
from democracy to political inclusiveness. The idea is that democracies and semi-
democracies may facilitate the transformation of horizontal inequalities into conflict, 
by permitting protest. This theoretical assertion is supported by her empirical analysis. 
Inclusiveness implies an electoral system which has greater characteristics of 
proportional representation, and where minority groups are allowed to participate in 
elections. Inclusiveness, combined with high horizontal inequality and democracy can 
exacerbate conflict at low levels of economic development. Thus, what is needed for 
peace is economic development and reduced horizontal inequalities in parallel with 
democratic development and inclusiveness. Despite the paucity of data on horizontal 
inequality, reasonable proxies show that it does matter in explaining conflict onset in 
a cross-section of countries, in contrast to the earlier assertions by many that 
inequality was immaterial to conflict risk.     
                                                 
13 Economic polarisation becomes insignificant in the cross-sectional regressions.    24
 
Three further points are worth emphasising at this juncture. First of all, horizontal 
inequality has to be measured at the level of the nation state. In a sense it refers to 
cross-sectional variation within a specific country. The data in different countries on 
horizontal inequality is still embryonic. Indices for horizontal inequality can be used 
for cross-country comparisons, whereas for a single conflict onset, gap measures may 
be sufficient. Secondly, most nation states do not keep detailed or systematic data on 
group inequalities (say between Catholics and Protestants, Hutus and Tutsis, Muslims 
and Christians etc.) because of obvious political sensitivities. However, ethnic 
questions in future household surveys across the developing world will go a long way 
in helping us to enumerate data on inter-group differences in socio-economic 
achievement. Finally, horizontal inequality as a cause of conflict can work in two 
directions, the rich may initiate conflict to extricate themselves from the relatively 
poor (the rage of the rich), or the poor may rise up in revolt against the rich (the rage 
of the poor). The former may be more likely in cases where a region suddenly 
discovers it can exist viably on its own resources, thus wishing to secede and not hand 
over revenues to the rest of the country. The latter is more likely to manifest it self in 
rebellions and revolutionary attempts to overthrow an oppressive state.        
 
4  Synthesis and Social Contract 
 
The greed versus grievance dichotomy is a useful entry point into the debate about the 
causes of conflict. In certain instances, where there are substantial quantities of 
capturable natural resource wealth present such as alluvial diamonds, oil or drugs, 
greed may be the dominant factor prolonging conflict, but without group formation 
(for which some historical grievances are important) violent collective action cannot 
take place. In short, grievances can be present without greed, but it is difficult to 
sustain greedy motives without some grievances. Although greed and grievance are 
regarded as competing views, they may be complementary, as greed may lead to 
grievances and vice versa. The greed or grievance explanations (or some hybrid form 
of both) may be necessary for the outbreak of civil war, but arguably they are not 
sufficient. This is because the causes enumerated in the two sections above contribute 
to the risk of civil war, yet some societies despite having conditions pre-disposing 
them to civil war, such as horizontal inequality, polarisation and natural resource   25
rents, do not descend into conflict. We argue that for the forces behind either greed or 
grievance to take the form of large-scale violence there must be other factors at work, 
specifically a weakening of what Addison and Murshed (2001) call the ‘social 
contract’ (see also Murshed, 2002). This is similar to the weak state capacity, and by 
implication poor institutional quality, arguments made above. Therefore, even if rents 
from capturable resources do constitute a sizeable prize, violent conflict is unlikely to 
take hold if a country has a framework of widely-agreed rules, both formal and 
informal, that govern the allocation of resources, including resource rents, and the 
peaceful settlement of grievances. Such a viable social contract can be sufficient to 
restrain, if not eliminate, opportunistic behaviour such as large-scale theft of resource 
rents, and the violent expression of grievance. 
 
War implies the absence or breakdown of contractual interaction, as indicated earlier. 
In traditional international relations theory, if nation states exist in a state of anarchy 
vis-à-vis each other, they may make war with each other if it is in their interests, a 
point also emphasised by the great philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1795. One, 
however, expects the presence of some degree of contract or consent within the 
modern nation state. Consequently, civil war is a reflection of the breakdown or 
degeneration of a contract governing interactions between various parties. Hirshleifer 
(1995) draws our attention to the fact that within a society, social contracts can be 
vertical if they are authoritarian in the sense of Thomas Hobbes, or they may be 
horizontal if fashioned with popular consent, as advocated by John Locke. The former 
may be described as dictatorial, and the latter as democratic. What constitutes the 
basis for a good social contract? Kant’s (1795)
14 essay on the ‘Perpetual Peace’ 
provides us with the fundamental clues in this direction. First, observe the usage of 
the expression ‘perpetual’, implying permanence as opposed to a transient truce. In 
the contemporary parlance of game theory, such agreements or contracts would be 
described as re-negotiation-proof or self-enforcing, so that there are no incentives to 
deviate from it. Secondly, and most crucially, Kant refers to a ‘republican’ 
constitution. By this he means the separation of powers
15 between the executive and 
                                                 
14 Although Kant speaks about a perpetual peace between nations, we can extend his argument to 
groups within a nation state. 
15 Despotism is when there is no separation of powers; those who administer laws are one and the same 
as those who decree them. Despotism is not simply confined to absolute monarchy or dictatorship, but 
can also be a feature of flawed democracies.    26
legislature (this ensures their proper and efficient functioning), and we may also add 
the independence of the judiciary. Put simply, this concept implies good government 
that holds the social contract together. Our contemporary understanding of good 
governance can include a host of other factors beyond the separation of powers, such 
as decentralized decision making powers. Thirdly, the stability of the peace depends 
upon the source of sovereignty or legitimate power within the nation. Although not 
enamoured of certain forms of rabble-led democracy, Kant nevertheless points out 
that good governance provided by a dictator or an absolute monarch is inherently 
unstable as he or his successors face temptations to deviate from good government, 
and the assurance of good governance is more forthcoming in a system of power that 
is representative of the people.
16  To Kant’s list of conditions for a perpetual peace 
(what we refer to as a stable social contract) we could add an all encompassing degree 
of economic interdependence manifested in peaceful economic exchange. The fact 
that commerce promotes peace was also pointed by Tom Paine (1791-2, page 265). 
Just as war between nations becomes less likely, due to their mutual all encompassing 
non-violent economic interdependence, the same argument can be made for 
competing groups within a nation state. It is because of the lack of economic 
development, evidenced by a relatively smaller manufacturing sector, and a low per-
capita income (implying less exchange), that leads to what Humphreys (2005) 
describes as sparse economic interaction, which makes wars between competing 
groups more likely, as they have less to lose from the collateral damage and 
destructiveness of war. Thus war, or the breakdown of the social contract, is more 
likely when there is economic underdevelopment, the result of a poor growth record. 
Interestingly, Kant (1795) and Paine (1792, p 320) point to a form of the greed 
hypothesis, which may explain colonial wars aimed at expropriating resources from 
inhabitants of distant lands, considered to be outside the pale of ‘civilization’.         
 
So what factors lead to the breakdown of the social contract within a nation state? 
What circumstances create incentives for groups within societies to choose war rather 
than resolve disputes peacefully? Clearly these seem to occur in failing states. Yet, the 
                                                 
16 The 18
th century English poet Alexander Pope had, by contrast, asserted that the form of government 
or source of power was immaterial in the presence of good governance: 
“For forms of government let fools contest 
Whate’er is best administered is best” 
[Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, 1707]. 
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eponymous term ‘failed state’ may be too vague and unhelpful in this regard. Among 
the various factors, three reasons may be highlighted. The first refers to the fiscal and 
revenue sharing agreements the state (or those in power) have with various 
stakeholders, and the breakdown of these arrangements can produce greed and/or 
grievance. Secondly, in the face of an unstable polity where the separation of powers 
and the sources of (legitimate or illegitimate) power are inherently unstable, it is 
important to focus on individual incentives faced by rulers that may or may not cause 
them to promote development and modernisation. The famous Lipset (1960) 
modernisation hypothesis states that demands for democracy surely follow economic 
development and the attainment of a high standard of living; once a particular (high) 
level of average income is achieved violence becomes a very costly means of settling 
disputes. The road to peace and democracy is therefore along sustained economic 
growth. Finally, the real culprit as far as the breakdown of the social contract is 
considered could be growth failure in low-income developing countries because it 
creates conditions where violence is more attractive. Low growth also implies a more 
undiversified economic structure, increased susceptibility to terms of trade shocks and 
dependence on external aid.  
 
Within nation states, the fiscal system will secure a workable social contract if the 
allocation of public expenditures and the apportionment of taxes are judged to be fair, 
or at least not so unfair that some groups judge taking resources by force the better 
option. There are many examples of conflicts emerging out of fiscal disputes. Côte 
d'Ivoire, for instance, became unstable with the collapse of the social contract 
engineered by the late President Houphouët-Boigny, in which he allocated public 
spending across the regions to successfully buy the loyalty of the country's ethnic 
groups. Disputes over the apportionment of revenues from natural resources are 
especially common and, as in Indonesia and Nigeria, these take on ethnic and regional 
dimensions. Contemporary civil wars are more often related to the breakdown of 
explicit or implicit arrangements to share resources or revenues, rather than the 
absence of an agreement to share resources or rents. One reason that a contract to 
share revenues encounters difficulties is the imperfect credibility with which the side 
that controls the 'pot' honours its commitment. There may be two parties to the 
potential armed conflict, say a government and a rebel group, where the government 
party has access to revenues and royalties, but is threatened by the excluded rebel   28
group which may violently overthrow the government as in Addison and Murshed 
(2001). On the other hand, the rebels may choose not to fight if they receive a fiscal 
transfer from the government. Similarly, the government has a choice between 
fighting the rebels and offering it a fiscal transfer. A feasible social contract favouring 
peace must give the rebels as much utility via a credible transfer as they would get in 
the event of a probable overthrow of the state. A social contract favouring peace in 
return for a transfer is infeasible if the probability of toppling the government by war 
is greater than the chances of its credibly making the transfer. Also the social contract 
is less likely with regimes that prefer military expenditure over making a fiscal 
transfer to the rebels, common in countries with powerful militaries. There is, 
therefore, a trade-off between military expenditure and a credible transfer. When the 
transfer is highly improbable, and the potential spoils rich, warfare is more likely.  
 
Furthermore, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) argue that the causal mechanism between 
conflict and lootable resources is broadly speaking a government revenue effect. This 
implies examining how the state obtains its revenues--whether or not taxing the 
mineral sector (which may or may not be lootable) is important to the state. Even if a 
lootable sector exists it may not be important for state revenues if other revenue 
sources exist side-by-side. Additionally, the mode of extraction matters-------whether 
it is artisanal or industrial. Only the former makes resources lootable. Finally, and 
most importantly, how governments spend their revenue is significant-----if the state 
spends its revenues on social welfare, military expenditure and growth enhancing 
investment, conflict is less likely than if it appropriates revenues for factional and 
kleptocratic purposes. Consider Sierra Leone. Prior to 1985 its alluvial diamonds were 
extracted in an industrial fashion rather than by artisans making it non-lootable. It did 
not collapse into civil war until after that. 
 
Conflict-affected nations have histories of weak social contracts (or a once strong 
social contract that has degraded). This weakness is in many instances a legacy of 
colonialism which institutionalised mechanisms favouring settlers over indigenous 
peoples (Guatemala, Zimbabwe, South Africa); divide and rule favouring one ethnic 
group over another, as in Rwanda; market controls to create rents for settlers to the 
cost of locals (Zimbabwe); and the expropriation of land and resource rents (Angola, 
and the Belgian Congo). A single ethnic group, or a subset, often assumed power in   29
the immediate post-independence era, subjugating others and concentrating the fruits 
of state power—public employment, other public spending, and resource rents—into 
its own hands (Burundi and Rwanda). Pre-colonial ethnic rivalry over territory and 
assets, the case in resource-scarce countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan, 
and the failure of long-standing independent states to strengthen mechanisms of 
political representation, also lie behind weak social contracts. Hegre et. Al. (2001) 
point out that the risk of conflict is lower in both well established democracies and 
autocracies perhaps because of greater state capacity. It suggests that conflict risk is at 
its highest during transitions to and away from democracy when state capacity is 
weak, and also in fledgling and imperfect democracies (anocracies). A final 
complexity in fatally weakening social contracts was the interaction of these 
'domestic' factors with external events, notably the Cold War, which provided finance 
and ideological succour to ruling elites and rebels. The net result of these processes is 
the accumulation of grievances within the context of a disintegrating social contract 
that would otherwise have provided the rules of the game to govern the distribution of 
the social pie and to achieve peaceful conflict resolution. The state is increasingly 
perceived to exercise favouritism in public spending and to tax unjustly. These 
circumstances can also promote greed-based motivations aimed at controlling natural 
resources. 
  
With regard to incentives faced by rulers in developing countries, it has to be 
remembered that until the end of the cold war most developing countries were ruled 
by strong men. Some promoted development, others did not. Dunning (2005) makes 
an argument, based on a two period-two agent-two sector game theoretic model, about 
choices by rulers regarding the future growth path of the economy in the context of 
natural resource abundance. He compares Mobutu’s Zaire (1965-1997) to Suharto’s 
Indonesia (1965-98) and Botswana during the same period. In Botswana, revenues 
from Kimberlite diamonds were very stable, due to Botswana’s unique relationship 
with De Beers and its important position as a major supplier. It did not need to 
diversify it economy. But it chose a developmental path because of the mature nature 
of political elites there. In Indonesia and Zaire resource flows were volatile. In one 
case the dictator (Suharto) chose diversification and growth enhancing strategies, as 
well as policies aimed at equalisation and poverty reduction to contain political 
opposition. Development in Indonesia was impressive, and may have led, at least   30
partially, to endogenous demands for democracy (Lipset, 1960). In the other case 
(Zaire, now DRC), Mobutu did not, because he felt that diversification and investment 
in infrastructure would loosen his grip on power and strengthen political opposition to 
him based on ethnicity. Zaire or the DRC has perhaps the poorest post-1960 growth 
record on the planet. Perhaps, in East Asia greater fears of communism strengthened 
benevolence in dictators (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia), whereas in 
Africa a certain type of factionalism dominated policies and politics, retarding 
growth-enhancing economic diversification and infrastructural development. 
 
Turning to the all-encompassing importance of growth in promoting peaceful 
economic interaction and the social contract, it is worthwhile examining a few of the 
broad stylized facts regarding conflict across developing countries since about 1960. 
To get an empirical feel for some of these macro-channels, a descriptive look at the 
data may be in order. Table 1 gives us 17 countries with the highest conflict incidence 
since 1960,
17 along with their average annual long-term growth rates of per-capita 
income accompanied by the typology of the economy and the most frequently 
occurring regime type. In table 1, we compare growth rates, the combined democracy 
and autocracy score known as Polity 2, endowment type and conflict intensity or 
incidence in selected developing countries during the period 1965-2000. The Polity 
score is an imperfect proxy for institutional capacity and governance, but we have 
good time series data on these. This is coded 1 for autocracies (those with an 
autocracy score below -4), 3 for democracies (for democracy scores above 4) and 2 
for anocracies that have both democratic and autocratic characteristics (with scores of 
between -4 and 4). The endowment typology is based upon a country’s principal 
exports,
18 and is subject to change. Note that countries can have more than one year of 
civil war in any given calendar year if there are several conflicts taking place within 
the nation simultaneously (Burma, India, Ethiopia, Philippines, Iraq and Angola). 
Also, incidence does not imply anything about conflict intensity, which is measured 
by fatalities.  
 
                                                 
17 We have excluded Israel with 49 years, as it is a rich country when one excludes the Palestinian 
territories, as well as Cambodia (36 years) and Yemen (23 years) because of the paucity of economic 
data. 
18 This is based on a country’s principal exports, which are described as point (mineral or fuel), coffee-
cocoa, diffuse (other agricultural) or manufacturing.   31
Table 1: Conflict Years, Growth, Polity and Economic Typology in Selected Countries 
Country  Conflict incidence  








Economic typology  
Burma (Myanmar)  177  1  1.5%  Diffuse, Point 
India 104  3 2.4% Manufacturing 
Ethiopia 81  1  -0.3%  Coffee/Cocoa 
Philippines 59  1;2;3  0.9% Diffuse,  Manufacturing 
Iraq 57  1  -3.5%  Point 
Angola 43  1  -2.1%  Point 
Iran 41  1;2  -1.0%  Point 
Algeria 37  1;2  1.0%  Point 
Chad 36  1 -0.6% Point 
Colombia 35  3  2.1%  Coffee/Cocoa 
Indonesia 32  1  4.8%  Point,  Manufacturing 
Guatemala 31  1;2  0.7%  Coffee/Cocoa 
Sudan 31  1;2;3  0.5%  Diffuse,  Point 
South Africa  31  2  0%  Point 
Mozambique 27  1  1.3%  Diffuse 
Uganda 23  1;2  2.5%  Coffee/Cocoa 
Sri Lanka  22  3  3.0%  Diffuse, Manufacturing 
Sources: Conflict years at http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict; UNCTAD data base and Murshed 
(2004) for the typology of the economy; Polity data at www.cidcm.umd.edu/insr/polity; and World 
Development Indicators (2002) for growth rates.   
 
Only five of these high conflict incidence nations reported in Table 1 have a per-
capita income growth rate in excess of 2% per annum in the long-term: Indonesia, 
India, Sri Lanka, Colombia and Uganda. Generally speaking, poor growth performers 
have more conflict years in Table 1. Only four economies (India, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka and Mozambique) have not been point-source (mineral/fuel exporting) or 
coffee/cocoa economies (the Burmese conflicts are fuelled by trade in illegal 
substances which cannot be reported here, because of data paucity). This lends some 
support to the arguments made in section 2 regarding conflict and its association with 
natural resources across countries. 
 
Murshed (2006) points out that only four point-sourced and three coffee/cocoa based 
economies have had growth rates of over 2% per annum in per-capita income. 
Botswana and Indonesia are the best performing point-sourced economies.   32
Furthermore, only three point-sourced countries and four coffee/cocoa economies did 
not descend into some form of civil war, as noted in Murshed (2006). Diffuse 
economies also have conflict; examples of the high incidence of civil wars occurring 
in diffuse economies are in South Asia, the Philippines and Burma, as well as 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in Africa. In total, eight out of thirty diffuse economies 
have avoided civil war, a record that is better than for point-sourced and coffee/cocoa 
based economies. Two prominent examples of growth failures not experiencing civil 
war are Tanzania and Zambia. Notwithstanding India, manufacturing exporters are 
least likely to experience outright civil war. Perhaps, this is because they have the best 
growth rates and institutional quality. They are also more diversified economies, and 
are able to withstand the commodity price and national income fluctuations that make 
growth failure more likely. Growth also needs to be pro-poor, which ultimately means 
less inequality, so as to minimise the effects of horizontal inequalities and 
polarisation. 
 
It is discernable that India, Sri Lanka and Colombia are the stable democracies in the 
post 1960 era that have had civil wars, including high intensity conflict. Many of the 
transitions in regime type from autocracy to anocracy to democracy (during 1960-
2000) are described in Murshed (2006). Multiple switches in all directions are 
possible, and not just from autocracy to democracy. Nevertheless, only 5 out of the 
seventeen nations with a high conflict incidence have ever been democracies with a 
democracy score over 4. Democracy, even stable democracy, does not guarantee the 
absence of armed conflict, both of the secessionist and rebel varieties, as the examples 
of India, Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and others indicate. Autocracies also 
fall into conflict, nevertheless, stable autocracies such as China and Singapore have 
avoided civil war, as did Taiwan and South Korea which became democracies 
recently. Despite prominent outliers such as India, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia, most 
conflict prone countries are neither stable democracies nor autocracies, lending 
support to the Hegre et. al. (2001) finding that conflict risk is greatest when regime 
types are in transition, say from autocracy to democracy.   
 
In summary, the breakdown of the social contract captures institutional 
malfunctioning, the counterpart of the mechanisms in the middle of the greed 
hypothesis discussed in section 2; it is also crucial in transforming grievances into   33
collective violence. A failing social contract may be the real signal of the risk of civil 
war, for the purposes of conflict prevention. 
 
5  Summary and Measurement Issues 
 
Pure versions of the greed hypothesis are, on their own, unsatisfactory explanations 
for the causes of conflict. Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed (2002) construct a game-
theoretic model of contemporary conflict involving the competition for resources 
combined with historical grievances. In addition to resource rents, grievances also 
play their part in fuelling conflict by explaining inter-group non-cooperation and 
serving to lower the cost of participation in conflict. Conflict can increase because of 
heightened intrinsic grievances, or because there are more lootable resources. In 
reality the competing greed versus grievance hypotheses may, after all, be 
complementary explanations for conflict. Insofar as they do provide alternative views, 
a fair test for their relative explanatory powers is best conducted at the level of a 
quantitative country-case study, because cross-country comparisons of horizontal 
inequality are still at very early stages of development due to the lack of data. 
Indonesia’s resource rich regions that have had separatist conflicts with the federal 
government offer us a striking contrast in trying to gauge the relative explanatory 
power of the greed versus grievance explanations for conflict. When viewed via the 
lens of a detailed quantitative case study, the grievance and horizontal inequality 
explanations dominate any greed motivation. Yet, when looked at as one observation 
among many through the prism of a cross-country study, Indonesia’s resource-rich 
reasons are examples of a modified form of the greed explanation (resources helping 
to prolong the duration of conflict and encouraging secession). It would appear, 
therefore, that the greed explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works 
in cross-country studies, but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in 
quantitative country-case studies. Grievances and horizontal inequalities may, after 
all, be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist. 
Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent 
conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown which we describe as the 
failure of the social contract.        
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As yet, no empirical models at the level of cross-national analysis exist to properly 
test for the relative power of greed vis-à-vis horizontal inequality type grievances in 
explaining conflict onset. This is not just a result of constraints posed by insufficient 
data. Greed and grievance can and do co-exist; because one breeds the other a model 
of their simultaneous determination is required, along with the contribution of poverty 
(which is chiefly about the lack of growth) and institutional quality. Furthermore, the 
existing econometric literature regarding the causes of conflict allows us to infer little 
about the true nature of the causal links between the phenomena examined. Tests for 
causality require sufficiently long time series data; unless techniques of dynamic 
panel data analysis are employed, inferences about causality will remain limited in 
nature. Despite these shortcomings, a review of the existing empirical literature on the 
causes of conflict informs us that the most robustly significant predictor of conflict 
risk and its duration is some indicator of economic prosperity (or lack of poverty) 
such as income per-capita within a cross-section where average income does vary. 
This is because at a higher income people have more to lose from the destructiveness 
of conflict (Lipset, 1960); and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning 
social contract, institutions and state capacity. Above all, there is less poverty; masses 
of impoverished individuals provide the best recruitment grounds for rebel fighters. 
 
Endemic poverty is the standard setting in which conflict impacts on the majority of 
households in developing countries. Poor rural households (or at least their young 
adult male members) are more likely to participate in conflict, out of necessity, as 
they have fewer options. Conflict will also lead to the degradation of their already 
miniscule asset base. Once conflict ends, they will also have fewer productive assets 
and human capital at their disposal to rebuild their livelihoods. This also makes 
fashioning lasting peace more difficult.     
   
A few comments about post-conflict reconstruction are in order; see Addison and 
Murshed (2005) on this. Growth, by raising the tax base, increases the possibilities of 
redressing grievances through fiscal transfers. And growth itself provides additional 
income to further reduce grievance (and perhaps mitigate greed) and tightens the 
labour market, thereby reducing the attractiveness of joining a warlord or rebel group. 
But just as economic growth in general can distribute broadly or narrowly its benefits 
across society—depending upon the initial distribution of assets and skills—so too   35
does reconstruction-led growth. Pre-war asset and skill distributions may have been 
highly unequal (with the resulting grievances contributing to conflict), and can worsen 
dramatically during wartime. The already poor often lose the few assets they have, 
and looting adds to the number of poor. In contrast, warlords and their followers 
accumulate assets, and so while the early years of peace may see quite rapid growth it 
can be very narrow in its benefits—unless policies are put in place to restore the 
productive assets and human capital of the poor. The immediate post-conflict situation 
may offer a golden opportunity for pro-poor asset redistribution as well (something 
that cannot be done easily during peace), although this can be impeded when rich 
'winners' from war block the necessary measures. 
 
The 'post-conflict' economy will be highly distorted, and this can impose an 
unfortunate path-dependence on reconstruction and growth. One source of distortion 
is the sharp increase in transactions costs resulting from war (including the destruction 
of transport, the planting of land mines, and institutional collapse) that drive a wedge 
between producer and consumer prices. Typically, production (especially agriculture) 
is more vulnerable, leading to a sharper increase in its transactions costs compared to 
other sectors such as urban-based trade and services. If a peace deal is signed, then 
transactions costs start to fall. Note that if peace is uneasy then there is an additional 
constraint on rebuilding the social contract via broad-based reconstruction and 
growth. Conflict raises uncertainty about the future, and therefore affects the private 
discount rates of potential investors. Restarting activity in pro-poor production 
activities such as agriculture can therefore be especially hard after war when the peace 
is uneasy, since while transactions costs can be reduced and infrastructure rebuilt, an 
uneasy peace keeps private discount rates high. Consequently the reconstruction-
growth path may create insufficient income and employment, and its narrowness 
leading to frustration amongst large sections of the excluded population.  
 
In summary, if grievance is the main source of conflict then broad-based 
reconstruction is essential to recreating a sustainable social conflict. In conclusion, we 
need better data on regionally based indices for horizontal inequality, requiring not 
only information on income, assets, health and education, but also subjective 
measures of well being, along with better governance and political data at the national 
level, as well as more detailed information on minorities. With regard to the agenda   36
for future research, and how we utilise this data, we need to form sensible hypotheses 
based on theory. In this regard the political economy of growth failure and 
institutional degradation must inform us, along with theories of deprivation and 
alienation. We also need to broaden the meaning of households in poverty to take into 
account the macroeconomic picture.   37
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